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Introduction to Lotteries in the US 
 Since 1964, when New Hampshire became the first state to offer a state-run lottery in the 
20
th
 century, lotteries have become commonplace around the US. As of 2013, 43 states and the 
District of Columbia offered lotteries and these games have become a small but important 
component of state revenues. In 2011, state lotteries generated more than $18 billion for state 
governments, representing 1.7% of all government revenues generated by states excluding 
transfers from the federal government  (Humphreys and Matheson, 2013).  
 Early in American history, lotteries were quite common but also were generally operated 
by private organizations, not by state governments. For example, the construction and expansion 
of many early private American universities, including Harvard and Princeton, were financed in 
part through lottery sales. Prominent American leaders also lent their support to lotteries 
designed to raise funds for public works. John Hancock’s signature appears on lottery tickets 
sold to fund the construction of Faneuil Hall while George Washington administered the 
unsuccessful 1768 Mountain Road Lottery in Virginia, and Ben Franklin organized a lottery 
during the American Revolution to finance the purchase of cannons to aid in the defense of 
Philadelphia (Matheson and Grote, 2008). 
While the organization and operation of lotteries in early America was generally 
undertaken by private individuals and groups, governments still had a role in authorizing 
lotteries. For example, in 1612 King James I of England issued a royal decree authorizing the 
Virginia Company to create a lottery to provide funds for Jamestown, the first English colony in 
America. Between 1612 and 1621, the company raised 29,000 pounds sterling to support the 
colony (Jamestown-Yorktown Foundation, 2013). Indeed, the rules regarding the authorization 
of lotteries were an issue of contention in the lead-up to the Revolutionary War when, in 1769, 
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the British crown attempted to prevent the sale of lottery tickets by groups or individuals that had 
not received royal permission (Dunstan, 1997). 
Lotteries began to fall out of favor in the early 1800s as governments developed 
alternative methods of generating revenue, moral objections to lotteries began to rise, and 
concern about fraud in privately run lotteries increased. New York became the first state to ban 
new games in 1821 when its constitution was amended to prohibit lotteries not otherwise 
“previously provided for by law.” (Benjamin, 2013) In 1833, New York ended lotteries 
completely and was joined in its prohibition by Pennsylvania and Massachusetts. Within just a 
few years most states had stopped authorizing lotteries, and by 1860 only Delaware, Kentucky, 
and Missouri still allowed these games of chance (Dunstan, 1997).  
  Lotteries returned after the American Civil War as states in the South desperately 
searched for new sources of revenue during Reconstruction. These lotteries were generally short-
lived with one very notable exception. The last existing lottery of the 19
th
 century was run by the 
Louisiana State Lottery Company, a private firm granted a 25-year charter in 1868 by the 
Louisiana state legislature in exchange for a $40,000 annual payment to the state. The legislature 
also banned other organized gambling at the same time, giving the Louisiana State Lottery 
Company a monopoly on gambling in the state. The company also actively sold tickets around 
the US, generating over 90% of its revenue outside of the state of Louisiana, but the company’s 
ability to evade lottery prohibitions in other states came to an end in 1890 when the US Congress 
banned the interstate transportation of lottery tickets and advertisements, a law whose 
constitutionality was upheld by the Supreme Court in 1892. The company’s charter was not 
renewed by the state of Louisiana in 1893, despite heavy lobbying by the company that included 
large bribes offered to members of the state legislature (Louisiana Lottery Corporation, 2013). 
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The company then moved its operations to Honduras and continued to illegally sell lottery tickets 
in the US until its final closure by US law enforcement in 1907.  
 Lotteries began to return to the US in 1964 when New Hampshire opened the first state-
sanctioned game of the 20
th
 century. An overwhelming majority of states followed in the 
subsequent decades with state lotteries spreading to 43 states and the District of Columbia by 
2013. State-authorized lotteries in the 20
th
 and 21
st
 century were distinctly different than those of 
the 19
th
 century, however, in that in all cases the lotteries were directly operated by the state 
governments themselves. In the 19
th
 century, a “state lottery” was more likely to mean a lottery 
operated by private individuals but with a state sanction, rather than the modern American 
meaning of the word where a “state lottery” is essentially a state-owned enterprise under the 
direct control of the state government and with the state government being the residual claimant 
of any operating profits. This operational structure has begun to change in the past 2 years in the 
US as numerous state governments have begun to privatize their lottery operations.  
 Private operation of public lotteries is nothing new in the rest of the world. Since its 
beginning in 1994, the UK Lottery has been operated on a for-profit basis by the private 
company Camelot in exchange for a profit allowance of 0.5% of gross ticket sales. The Italian 
Lottery is operated by the private firm Lottomatica.  
 In the United States, Illinois was the first state to privatize the operations of its lottery 
when it handed over control to the Northstar Corporation in July 2011. Northstar is a joint 
venture of Scientific Games, a New York-based manufacturer of lottery tickets and gaming 
equipment, and GTECH, a wholly owned subsidiary of Lottomatica. Northstar beat out UK rival 
Camelot in its bid to become the first private company to operate a state lottery in the US. 
Indiana handed control of its lottery over to GTECH in 2012. In 2013, New Jersey awarded 
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operations of its lottery to Northstar NJ, another joint venture of Lottomatica, Scientific Games, 
and a third venture partner. Pennsylvania agreed in principle to award control of its lottery to 
Camelot in 2013, as well, but public pressure and internal divisions with the Pennsylvania 
government scuttled the deal. 
 
Introduction to Casinos in the US 
 Throughout much of American history, many taverns and roadhouses permitted card and 
dice games, but large dedicated casinos were rare. In the early 1800s, the same moral objections 
that rose against lotteries led to a disapproval of this type of gaming, particularly in the East. By 
the 1840s, the center of casino gaming had moved to riverboats on the Mississippi River and to 
New Orleans (Dunstan, 1997). While recreational gambling was generally considered acceptable 
in the region, professional gamblers and card sharps were looked down upon with severe 
disfavor. 
The American Civil War along with the burgeoning rail system in the country led to the 
decline of the great riverboats. In their place, casinos began to flourish temporarily in mining 
boom towns such as San Francisco (1849), Cripple Creek and Central City, Colorado (1859), 
Virginia City, Nevada (1859), and Deadwood, South Dakota (1874). As miners either moved 
away when the mines played out or were replaced by more genteel residents that gentrified 
former mining towns, the “Wild West” atmosphere that encouraged the development of casinos 
also disappeared. By the turn of the 20
th
 century, casino gaming was again illegal throughout the 
country. Nevada re-legalized casino gaming in 1931, and it held a nationwide monopoly on the 
activity (at least legally) until New Jersey introduced casinos to Atlantic City in 1975 (Dunstan, 
1997). 
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 Other states legalized the operation of privately operated casinos over the next three 
decades although these casinos were generally limited in number or stakes. Often gambling 
legalization harkened back to the historical roots of gambling in the state. For example, gambling 
in states along the Mississippi was frequently limited to riverboats, and states with mining 
heritage opened up former mining towns such as Cripple Creek, Central City, and Deadwood to 
casinos. As of the end of 2012, 513 commercial casinos operated in 23 states generating $37.3 
billion in gambling related revenue (American Gaming Association, 2013).  
The Seminole Tribe in Florida opened a casino on tribal land offering high stakes bingo 
in 1979. The state sued to close the facility, but in Seminole Tribe v. Butterworth (1981), the 
Federal Appeals Court for the region determined that, since the state allowed charitable 
organizations in the state to offer bingo, it did not have the jurisdiction to prohibit the sovereign 
government of the Seminole Tribe from offering a similar game even at higher stakes, nor did 
the state have the right to limit attendance at the Tribe’s casino to Tribe members. 
The US Supreme Court followed up this decision with its own ruling in California v. 
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians (1987), which granted Native American Tribes the right to 
offer gambling options largely free of state control on tribal reservations as long as the state 
allowed a regulated version of the game to operate elsewhere in the state. Tribal casinos were not 
permitted to offer games that were criminally prohibited by state law or banned by federal 
statute. 
Given the rise of Indian casinos following these favorable court rulings, the federal 
government passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, which provided uniform and 
formalized gaming rules for Native American reservations across the country. The Act divided 
gambling activity into three classes. Class I gaming included traditional tribal and social gaming 
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for low stakes. Such activity was not subject to regulation from outside of tribal government. 
Class II gaming included activities where players exclusively played against one another rather 
than the house such as bingo and poker. Such games were permitted without state regulation if 
these games were permitted in any fashion elsewhere in the state.  Class III gaming included 
gambling activities where bettors played against the house such as blackjack, slot machines, 
craps, and roulette. The establishment of an Indian casino with Class III gaming requires a 
compact with the state in which the tribal reservation is located. As of the end of fiscal year 
2011, 421 tribal casinos operated in 28 states generating $27.2 billion in gaming revenue 
(National Indian Gaming Commission, 2012). Between Native American casinos and 
commercial gaming establishments, 39 states currently offer some form of casino gambling. 
 
Introduction to Pari-mutuel Betting in the US 
 Horse racing and other forms of pari-mutuel racing are another form of gambling with a 
long history in the US. The first horse racing track was laid in 1665 on Long Island in New 
York, and tracks spread throughout the country with the expansion of the nation. In 1865, pari-
mutuel betting was invented by Pierre Oller, a French perfume shop keeper and rapidly became 
the standard for horse racing. By the early 1900s, the general anti-gambling ideals of the nation, 
which led to the decline of legal casinos and lotteries, also eliminated betting at horse tracks 
everywhere in the country except for Maryland and Kentucky (Nash, 2009). The advent of the 
Great Depression in the 1930s led to an expansion of many forms of gambling as a form of 
economic stimulus including horse racing and charitable bingo. 
 After peaking in the mid-1970s, horse racing has suffered a gradual decline in general 
interest, at least in part due to the expansion of other types of legalized gambling, including 
 8 
 
lotteries and casinos (Nash, 2009). The total handle wagered on US races totaled $10.9 billion in 
2012 although net betting revenue is a fraction of this figure (LaMarra, 2013). As of 2012, 78 
tracks in 28 states offered thoroughbred racing and 36 tracks in 16 states offered harness racing. 
Most tracks have a betting window that offers a variety of general pari-mutuel bets. Many tracks 
also offer simulcast betting on races at other tracks, and 49 tracks in 14 states also offer some 
type of additional gaming ranging from full service casinos to video lottery terminals or other 
electronic gaming devices (American Gaming Association, 2013). 
 
Introduction to Sports Gambling in US 
 As noted previously, gambling on horse racing has a long history in the US. Betting on 
other sporting events grew in line with the growth of organized sports in the late 1800s and early 
1900s. Indeed, the history of   nearly every league in the US goes hand in hand with a story of 
gambling corruption. Baseball’s National League, the forerunner of Major League Baseball and 
the oldest American professional sports league still in existence, formed in 1876. By 1877, the 
Louisville Grays ended the season mired in a betting scandal and ceased operation at the end of 
the year. The Ohio League, a precursor of the National Football League, formed in 1903 as a 
loose association of American football teams. Just three years later, the Canton Bulldogs – 
Massillon Tigers betting scandal led to the demise of the Canton club and a decline in the 
popularity of the league. Of course, the 1919 “Black Sox” scandal, where members of the 
Chicago White Sox were accused of throwing the World Series remains American sports’ most 
famous case of gambling corruption while the 1948 NCAA basketball point shaving incident 
high-lighted corruption in the college ranks. 
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 Following the formation of professional leagues, “pool cards,” which allowed bettors to 
gamble on a slate of games, became popular although not generally legal. Following in the 
footsteps of its casino businesses, Nevada officially legalized sports gambling in 1949, but major 
casinos didn’t join until Stardust opened a sports book in 1976.  
 The main impetus that led to the establishment of large, commercial sports books at 
Nevada casinos was the US elimination of a 10% tax on sports gambling in 1974. This tax law 
change led to an increase in sports gambling handle in Nevada from $825,767 in 1973 to 
$3,873,217 in 1974 and $26,170,328 in 1975 (NFL v. Delaware, 1977). Of course, major casinos 
could not ignore this surge in this particular gambling activity and most followed the lead of the 
Stardust after 1976. By 2012, over $3.44 billion was wagered at 182 sports betting locations 
throughout the state (UNLV, 2013). 
In other states, Montana legalized pool cards beginning in 1974. The Delaware Lottery 
offered NFL parlay tickets in 1976 and won a court case against the NFL and its allies for the 
right to offer the game. Nevertheless, the Delaware sports lottery folded after one year because 
the fixed-odds nature of the tickets couldn’t guarantee the statutory tax contribution required 
under the state’s lottery law. The Oregon Lottery offered NFL parlay tickets from 1998-2007 and 
NBA parley tickets in 1998 and 1999 (although the NBA ticket did not include games featuring 
the local NBA team, the Portland Trailblazers). The state yielded to pressure from the NCAA in 
2007 and terminated its sports lottery in exchange for the NCAA lifting its ban on hosting 
college basketball tournament games in the state.   
With the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 (PASPA), the federal 
government banned sports gambling in all states except those with existing legalized sports 
gaming, which included Nevada, Oregon, Montana, and Delaware. The act bans other lottery 
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associations from basing games on sports outcomes, prohibits sports books at casinos outside of 
these states, and prohibits sports gambling at tribal casinos since the federal government has the 
ultimate jurisdiction over civil laws on Native American reservations.   
 Since the passage of PASPA, the Montana Lottery has expanded into sports gambling 
with the introduction of Fantasy NFL and Fantasy NASCAR games in 2008. It should be noted 
that these games do not command a high level of player interest, generating weekly handles of 
just $2,500 per week for NASCAR and $5,000 per week for the NFL (Montana Lottery, 2013.) 
The Delaware Lottery reintroduced NFL parlay lottery tickets 2009 but lost a court case later in 
the year that would have allowed to the state’s lottery association to sell tickets with single game 
bets. A favorable ruling in the case, in effect, would have allowed the Delaware Lottery to create 
a fully functional sports book.  
Other states have recently begun to challenge PASPA’s virtual nationwide ban on sports 
gaming. New Jersey passed a law that would have allowed sports books at Atlantic City casinos 
in 2012, but the law was challenged by the major professional sports leagues and the NCAA. 
Preliminary court rulings have upheld PASPA, denying New Jersey the right to legalize sports 
gambling, but the state has appealed and the legal process is ongoing as of 2013. Should New 
Jersey ultimately prevail, it is extremely likely that multiple states, including California, would 
quickly consider legalizing general sports gambling within their own borders, and multiple state 
lottery associations could choose to follow Montana and Delaware in offering lottery games 
based on sports outcomes. 
 In summary, as of 2013 lotteries and casinos are widespread through the country with 
most states having legal access to one or both types of gaming. Sports gambling in the US is 
much more restricted. Only Nevada operates full sports books while lottery associations in 
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Montana and Delaware offer limited types of sports gambling. The Oregon Lottery has the right 
to operate limited sports gambling but has given up their sports lottery operations over a dispute 
with the NCAA. States are currently challenging the nationwide ban on sports gambling with 
New Jersey at the forefront. In terms of lottery management, the modern history of lotteries in 
the US has been that of state operation and management of lotteries, but there has been recent 
movement towards the privatization of state lotteries. Illinois privatized its lottery in 2011 
followed by Indiana in 2012 and New Jersey in 2013. A privatization scheme in Pennsylvania 
was rejected in 2013. The next section of this paper addresses the questions of whether 
privatization is an effective method of increasing lottery revenues and whether it should it be 
encouraged. 
 
Privatization of State Lotteries 
Standard economic theory generally states that free markets lead to optimal allocations of 
resources, suggesting that government intervention in the marketplace through the control of 
firms is unlikely to lead to improvements in societal welfare. Furthermore, since government 
firms do not operate by the same profit incentives that motivate private business owners, there is 
again concern that state-owned enterprises will fail to achieve the efficiency and productivity of 
which private firms are capable. On a grand scale, the economic success of western capitalistic 
nations compared to the economic stagnation experienced by the socialist former Soviet Bloc 
countries clearly highlighted the efficiency advantages of privately owned firms. The trend 
around the world over the past several decades has been one of reduced state-ownership of 
companies.  
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Of course, in cases where market failure exists, private firms are less likely to provide 
optimal outcomes. State-owned enterprises may provide relief in these cases. In many 
circumstances involving market failures, it is easy to find examples of state-owned enterprises 
selling goods and services to the public often in direct competition with private pro-profit or 
private non-profit firms. With respect to public goods, governments often provide public 
hospitals, parks, and schools. When natural monopolies exist, governments may directly sell 
goods like municipal water or electricity as opposed to allowing a highly regulated monopoly to 
exist. When firms sell products with significant negative externalities, government control of the 
retail establishment may reduce the likelihood of a profit-seeking firm selling more than the 
societally efficient level of production. For example, liquor stores in many states and cities in the 
US are government owned. Of course, state ownership is not the only solution to the problem of 
firms selling products with negative externalities. Most liquor stores in the US are not state-
owned enterprises but instead private firms subject to strict government regulation.  
With the privatization of lotteries, private firms are granted local monopolies and 
maximization of revenue may not by societally optimal, particularly with respect to concerns 
about problem gaming or the distributional impact of government revenue generation. As a case 
in point, in Camelot’s failed bid to win the contract for Illinois’ lottery in 2011, the company 
planned to increase annual per capita lottery ticket sales in the state from $171 in 2010 to $292 in 
2016 and in particular to raise annual sales on instant games from $92 to $161 per person 
(Illinois Lottery, 2010). While increasing ticket sales is unquestionably good from a revenue 
generation or profit maximization perspective, there is a real public policy question about raising 
government revenue in this manner.  Given the fact that lottery players are disproportionally 
poor(especially those who play instant games) encouraging the consumption of a product that, on 
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average, makes the poor poorer in order to supplement the incomes of the poor and provide 
funding for other state programs seems questionable at best 
Other questions also exist. Is sufficient innovation possible in the lottery industry to 
warrant introduction of a middleman who will take a portion of the profits? Privatization often 
succeeds in increasing profits by cutting costs, but the administrative costs of most state lotteries 
are only about 5% of revenues, limiting the efficiency gains that would be possible. Since most 
of the revenue gains from privatization would come from expanding revenues rather than cutting 
costs, there is the real question of whether gambling expansion is socially desirable. Often 
projections of increased revenue are driven by the introduction of video lottery terminals, 
internet gaming, or expanded advertising, all of which could be done without privatization of the 
lottery. Finally, it is important to ask whether states can write contracts that prevent privatization 
of profits when privatized lotteries do well, but socialization of losses when lotteries fail to meet 
expectations. 
 
Model and Methodology 
 In order to test the effect of privatizing a lottery, regression analysis will be performed on 
state-level data over time to determine the impact of state-level economic and demographic data 
on the level of transfers that a state lottery generates for the government.  Previous contributions 
to the lottery literature have suggested many demographic and economic variables to explain the 
level of lottery sales in a state.  Selecting from those variables, the current study will use 
population, income level, and the unemployment rate of a state to explain the level of transfers 
that a state lottery generates for the state government.  Lottery sales and lottery transfers are 
directly related to one another since more lottery sales will lead to more dollars transferred to the 
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government.  Because of the direct relationship between the two, it is reasonable to assume that 
any demographic or economic variables that affect lottery sales would have a similar effect on 
transfers to the government, even though dollars transferred will be lower than lottery sales due 
to prize payouts and commissions.  Transfers are the preferred variable for the current study 
because of the prediction that privatization can generate more revenues to the state.  The 
corollary to that prediction is that the revenues transferred should be higher, not that sales dollars 
are necessarily higher although higher sales are certainly one way to generate more transfers. 
 There is a rich lottery literature with a variety of contributions that test the impact of 
demographic and economic variables on lottery sales either within single states or across 
numerous states.  Considering only the variables used in the current model, the empirical results 
from these studies on population are consistent; however, there are mixed empirical results on 
unemployment rates and income.  A number of studies, including Clotfelter and Cook (1989), 
Ashley, Liu and Chang (1999) and Frees and Miller (2004) find that population has a positive 
impact on state lottery sales.  Regarding the unemployment rate, Mikesell (1994) and Scott and 
Garen (1994) both find that a higher unemployment has a positive impact on state lottery sales.  
However, DeBoer (1990) finds that unemployment rates in New York do not significantly 
impact lottery sales and Blalock, Just and Simon (2007) find a negative relationship between 
unemployment rates and sales.  Theoretically, one might expect a positive relationship between 
unemployment rates and lottery sales if lottery sales are regressive in nature and purchased 
relatively more by people who feel they have few economic alternatives of earning income or 
wealth in other ways.  Blalock, Just and Simon (2007) predict that a positive relationship 
between unemployment rates and lottery sales is an affirmation of prospect theory, “that 
individuals become more risk loving when they suffer a financial shock,” even though that 
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particular study does not support the theory empirically (Blalock, Just and Simon 2007, pp. 560-
1).  It may also be that lottery ticket sales are a normal good and, as opportunities to earn income 
decline due to higher unemployment rates, so, do state lottery sales, predicting a negative 
relationship between unemployment rates and sales. 
 The regressive nature of lottery sales along with the question of whether lotteries are 
normal goods applies equally to the results regarding state income and income per capita on sales 
and sales per capita in the lottery literature.  The general results are that while lottery sales are 
regressive in nature, implying that lower income households tend to spend a higher percentage of 
their income on lottery products than higher income households, they also tend to be normal 
goods, implying that sales dollars increase with higher incomes.
1
  This finding, however, is not 
consistent across the literature, with some studies finding the opposite results or no impact of 
income on lottery sales (in dollars or in per capita dollars, depending on the study). 
 Three different models are proposed and tested, using some combination of the variables 
previously described.  The goal of privatization is to increase revenue transfers from the state’s 
lottery games.  Furthermore, tests on both of the dependent variables (change in transfers and 
change in transfers per capita) indicate that the variables have unit roots. Thus, rather than using 
transfers or transfers per capita as the dependent variables, the models will use change in 
transfers and change in transfers per capita as the dependent variables to correct for the unit roots 
and to emphasize that transfers are expected to increase when the lottery is run by a private firm 
rather than by a state agency.  If individuals in the state are to be made better off through the 
management by a private firm, then transfer dollars per capita should rise as well. 
                                                          
1
 Studies that confirm either or both of these implications include Brinner and Clotfelter (1975), Clotfelter and Cook 
(1989),  Frees and Miller (2004), Blalock, Just and Simon (2007). 
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 The following models are tested empirically: 
1) Change in Transfersit = b0 + b1Change in Incomeit + b2Change in Unemploymentit + 
 b3Change in Populationit + b4Privatization Dummyit + αi + Tt + ɛit 
 
2) Change in Transfersit = b0 + b1Change in Incomeit + b2Change in Unemploymentit + 
 b3Privatization Dummyit + αi + Tt + ɛit 
 
3) Change in Transfers Per Capitait = b0 + b1Change in Income Per Capitait + b2Change in 
 Unemploymentit + b3Privatization Dummyit + αi + Tt + ɛit 
 
 Data for the variables represent the time period from 2005 to 2012.   Revenue transfers to 
the state that are generated by the lottery are based on a lottery’s fiscal year, which is typically 
from July to June with data provided by state lottery association websites.  Population data is 
provided by the Annual Estimated Populations Table as of July 1 at the end of each fiscal year 
for each state, as provided by the U.S. Census Bureau.   Personal income data for each state is 
provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis and state unemployment rates are provided by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
The privatization dummy is set equal to one if a state has ceded control of its lottery to a 
private management firm. Since the data set only includes observations through 2012, in effect, 
this analysis will only capture the effects of the first year of Illinois privatization. In other words, 
the number of private state-year observations is only one at time of writing. 
It should be noted that the initial year of Northstar’s operation of the Illinois Lottery is 
best described as problematic. The company promised $851 million in ticket sales, but only 
delivered $757 million, The company blamed foot-dragging by the state government in their 
promise to introduce expanded VLT gaming, but the firm was ultimately fined $20 million for 
failing to meet its revenue targets. (Garcia 2013) As an aside, the actual revenues generated 
nearly exactly matched the projections made by Camelot in their failed bid to operate the lottery.  
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 For each of these equations, initial regressions will be run on the data first without 
inclusion of state fixed effects (αi) or time effects (Tt) and then subsequently a second set of 
regressions will be run including both state fixed effects and time effects.   Given the discussion 
in the previous paragraphs, Change in Income (Per Capita) is expected to have a positive impact 
on Change in Transfers (Per Capita), based on the assumption that lottery products are normal 
goods.  Change in Unemployment could have either a positive or negative impact on Change in 
Transfers (Per Capita) depending on whether the regressive nature of lotteries or risky behavior 
of lower income individuals is more predominant than the nature of lotteries as normal goods.    
Change in Population is expected to have a positive impact on Change in Transfers as more 
individuals in a state would provide a larger market for lottery sales.  If privatization is 
successful at generating more income for a state, then the Privatization Dummy should have a 
positive impact on Change in Transfers (Per Capita). 
  
Results 
 Table 1 provides summary statistics for the variables used in the model, while the results 
of the regression analyses are provided in Tables 2 and 3.  Overall, the results reveal that the only 
variables with a statistically significant impact on the change in transfers of lottery revenue are 
the change in state income and the change in the unemployment rate.  In each of the two 
regressions without state fixed effects or time effects, change in income has a positive and 
significant effect on change in transfers, but this same relationship does not hold true on a per 
capita basis (see Table 3).   The coefficients in these two regressions are 0.0006 and 0.0007, 
indicating that an added $100 dollars of income increases lottery transfers by approximately 
$0.06 to $0.07 to the state.    The change in the unemployment rate is most consistently 
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significant variable, however.  In five of the six regression results, the change in unemployment 
provides a negative and statistically significant coefficient, confirming that lotteries appear to be 
normal goods, providing declining transfers to state governments as unemployment rates 
increase. The coefficient on change in unemployment is -3.750 for change in transfers without 
state fixed effects, between -6.582 and -6.615 for change in transfers with state fixed effects and 
equal to 1.548 or 1.392 for change in transfers per capita (with and without state fixed effects, 
respectively).   For interpretation purposes, this indicates that a one percentage point increase in 
unemployment tends to reduce transfers to the state by 3.75 million dollars or by 1.39 dollars per 
capita when state effects are not included.  The impact increases when state and time effects are 
included, indicating that the impact of changing unemployment on changes in government 
transfers from lotteries is even greater when other differences among states over time are held 
constant. The coefficient on population is never statistically significant and is very close to zero.  
Four of the six regressions have significant F-statistics, indicating that all of the coefficients are 
not equal to zero, all four of these models having change in transfers as the dependent variable 
rather than changes in transfers per capita. 
 The lack of any significant results for the model using transfers per capita as a dependent 
variable are not necessarily surprising, especially for the state fixed effects model.  Since 
transfers and population tend to be growing over time within states, dividing transfers by 
population should reduce much of the variability in the dependent variable when using panel 
techniques, and much of the remaining variability across states are additionally going to be 
attributed to the state fixed effects. 
 Of particular interest in this study is the lack of any measurable effect of privatization on 
transfers of lottery revenue as measured by the privatization dummy variable.  Granted, the 
 19 
 
model is only able to account for one year of privatization in the state of Illinois so the results are 
very preliminary.  However, given the supposedly superior efficiencies of private firms relative 
to government bureaucracies and the assumed ability to be more innovative and creative in their 
promotion of the lottery, one would at least expect some additional transfers of lottery dollars to 
the Illinois government relative to the other state governments for the 2012 fiscal year.  The 
coefficient on the Illinois dummy is positive in all six regressions; however, the standard error is 
large enough to make all of the positive coefficients not statistically different from zero.   This 
should give pause to those touting the merits of privately administered lotteries and also provide 
support for current and potentially future lawsuits in states like Pennsylvania and Ohio that have 
and will likely be filed to prevent the state from turning over lottery operations to a private 
company. 
 On the other hand, since the unemployment rate in Illinois actually increased from 2011 
to 2012 from 9.0% to 9.4%, and given the negative coefficient on the unemployment rate in all 
of the models, this indicates that things actually could have been much worse for the Illinois 
government in terms of transfers received from lottery sales. While the Illinois Lottery fell far 
short of the lofty promises made by Northstar, the actual revenues generated were slightly higher 
than would have been predicted given the state of the Illinois economy (although, naturally, care 
must be taken in place too much confidence in statistically insignificant coefficients.) Using the 
(non-statistically significant) point estimates on the Privatization Dummy for the 6 models 
tested, the Illinois Lottery in 2012 generated between $21.2 million and $28.9 million more than 
would have been predicted based on Illinois’ historical experience and its economic climate 
during that year. Combine these potential gains with the additional $20 million fine the state 
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collected from Northstar due to the company’s failure to meet its revenue projections, and a case 
can be made that privatization has actually been quite a positive experience for the state.  
 
Conclusion and Future Research 
 State-run lotteries offer products to consumers that add to the variety of other gambling 
options in the United States.  Growth in the lottery industry is discussed in relation to the growth 
of some of these other options, with a particular focus on sports gambling.  As states continue to 
seek additional ways to increase state transfers from lottery sales, many states are considering the 
option of privatizing their lottery operations in order to gain from the efficiencies and 
innovations of a privately operated company.  As demonstrated in this paper, however, states 
should be cautious about assuming that privately run companies can offer substantial gains in 
transfer dollars and they may struggle to meet their stated sales goals.  While the paper is 
preliminary in that there is only one year and one state with a full year of privatized operations, 
the empirical models do indicate that economic variables such as state unemployment rates and 
state income provide statistically significant predictors of changes in state transfer revenues 
while privatization of lotteries, based on the limited available data, do not have a significant 
impact.  As states such as Indiana and New Jersey join the ranks of states choosing to privatize 
their lottery operations, the data set can be expanded to include more observations for privately 
run state lotteries and the results offered by the expanded model will provide further conclusions 
on this controversial issue. 
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Table 1:  Summary Statistics 
Variable: Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Transfers (in milliions) 412.87 482.57 5.72 3,049.15 
Transfers Per Capita 74.21 81.84 6.62 375.06 
Income 260,419.80 291,407.30 19,976.50 1,669,594.00 
Income Per Capita 38,737.31 7,223.57 25,979.79 73,343.84 
Population 6,635,578.00 7,044,558.00 567,136.00 38,041,430.00 
Unemployment Rate 6.34 2.27 2.79 13.24 
Change in Transfers (in millions) 11.78 45.16 -161.15 382.77 
Change in Transfers Per Capita 1.11 8.60 -81.38 53.45 
Change in Income 9,137.51 16,704.94 -38,637.00 95,531.00 
Change in Income Per Capita 1,152.35 1,274.81 -1,950.90 5,253.33 
Change in Population 55,559.35 93,302.61 -273,963.00 581,457.00 
Change in Unemployment Rate 0.38 1.27 -2.37 4.78 
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Table 2: Regression Results 
 
      
  
         Dependent Variable: 
 
  
         Change in Transfers 
 
      
 
   No Fixed Effects 
 
  With Fixed Effects 
Constant 8.357** 7.964** 
 
11.684** 12.458*** 
 
(3.269) (3.224) 
 
(5.687) (3.631) 
Change in Income 0.0007*** 0.0006*** 
 
0.0002 0.0002 
 
(0.0002) (0.0002) 
 
(0.0002) (0.0002) 
Change in 
Unemployment -3.276 -3.750* 
 
-6.582*** -6.615*** 
 
(2.268) (2.176) 
 
(2.370) (2.358) 
Change in Population -0.00003 
  
0.00001 
 
 
-0.00003 
  
(0.00008) 
 Privatization Dummy 21.267 22.703 
 
28.92 28.552 
 
(43.826) (43.752) 
 
(45.869) (45.734) 
      N 300 300 
 
300 300 
F-statistic 6.05*** 7.89*** 
 
1.42* 1.44** 
Prob > F 0.0001 0.000 
 
0.0525 0.0463 
      *** significant at 1% level 
   ** significant at 5% level 
   * significant at 10% level 
    
  
 23 
 
 
     Table 3: Regression Results 
    
 
         Dependent Variable: 
 
Change in Transfers Per Capita 
    
    
 
No Fixed Effects 
 
With Fixed Effects 
Constant 1.983** 
 
2.077** 
 
(0.911) 
 
(0.986) 
Change in Income Per 
Capita -0.0003 
 
-0.0003 
 
(0.0005) 
 
(0.0006) 
Change in Unemployment -1.392*** 
 
-1.548*** 
 
(0.534) 
 
(0.568) 
Privatization Dummy 1.717 
 
2.235 
 
(8.516) 
 
(9.219) 
    N 300 
 
300 
F-statistic 3.26** 
 
0.95 
Prob > F 0.0220 
 
0.5730 
    *** significant at 1% level 
 ** significant at 5% level 
 * significant at 10% level 
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